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Abstract 
The advent of the EU-US Open Skies Agreement has been widely anticipated. A 
number of consequences have been predicted, for example, impacts on fares, on 
passenger volumes, choice and on consumer welfare. Airline costs are also 
predicted to fall as a result of increased competiveness and increased 
cooperation among airlines.  
 
In the short period since the implementation of the Agreement, it is relatively 
easy to assess the supply-side changes that have been made, but more difficult 
to make wider judgements. For example, can traffic growth be attributed to Open 
Skies and does airline and alliance market power result in less fare flexibility with 
consequently less influence on passenger volumes? This paper offers some 
insight into the data that will be required to make these and other wider 
judgements and discusses some methodological difficulties. Early estimates of 
the impact on passenger numbers are given using times series analysis focusing 
on London airports in particular London Heathrow and airports served by British 
Airway’s Open Skies Airline from Paris Orly and Amsterdam Schipol. 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There has been widespread interest in the introduction of the EU-US 
Open Skies Agreement. Before the Agreement commenced, 
consultancies undertook studies on the likely consequences of an open 
aviation area for the EU. These major studies by Brattle (2002) and Booz 
Allen Hamilton (2007) are briefly summarised in Pitfield (2009a, 2009b) 
along with the comments of government bodies and industry spokesmen. 
A special issue of the Journal of Air Transport Management contained 
papers from the AirNeth meetings in Belgium to which experts were 
invited to contribute and notable examples are given by Button (2009) and 
Humphreys and Morrell (2009). Pitfield has also covered this introductory 
discussion and undertaken some empirical work on France (Pitfield, 
forthcoming) and the Netherlands (Pitfield, 2010)1.  
 
The EU-US Open Skies Agreement came into force at the end of March 
2008 and the main provisions, reported in Pitfield (2009a, 2009b) are 
repeated below: 
 
• Removal of restrictions on route rights – any EU airline is allowed to 
fly from any EU city to any US city. Conversely, any US airline can 
fly into any EU airport and from there onto third destinations. In 
addition, EU airlines can fly between the US and non-EU countries 
that are members of ECAA, the European Common Aviation Area, 
such as Norway and Croatia. The unequal treatment of cabotage is 
                                                 
1 These results are repeated below in sections 7 and 8. 
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an issue; although US airlines can fly onwards in Europe, EU 
airlines cannot fly domestically in the US.  
 
• Foreign Ownership – the main change here is that US companies 
can now only own 49 percent of the voting rights in European 
Airlines, whereas European Airlines can still hold only 25 percent in 
US airlines, although they can own more in non-voting shares.  
 
It is the intransigence of the US position here, as well as on cabotage, that 
has led first to a delay in the implementation of the Agreement and then 
the EU’s right to suspend the Agreement if insufficient progress towards a 
revised Agreement is made by mid-2010. 
 
The mechanism by which there is a resultant change in consumer welfare 
as a result of the Agreement has been explained in Brattle (2002) and 
Booz Allen Hamilton (2007). The removal of restrictions on route rights 
permit the expansion of supply giving greater choice and the increased 
competition leads to downward pressure on airline costs and so fares. 
Prices are also thought to fall as a result of increased cooperation 
between airlines. 
 
It is clear that the supply side changes may be directly attributed to the 
Agreement. However, although passenger numbers may change it is 
difficult to attribute this to the underlying causes given the lack of data on 
costs and variations in fares. Pitfield (2009a, 2009b) addresses these 
concerns of the usability and availability of cost and fare data. By contrast, 
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passenger data are easily obtained from the US Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics so changes can be observed. The difficulty here is correctly 
attributing observed changes to the advent of the Agreement. What would 
the traffic have been if the Agreement had not been signed? If this can be 
determined, the counterfactual, then the observed changes on top of this 
may be correctly attributed to the Agreement. This paper is concerned 
with identifying these components of change in passenger numbers. The 
desiderata of improved data on costs and fares are noted in Pitfield 
(2009a, 2009b). 
 
Time series models or Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average 
(ARIMA) models are suited to model data over long time periods with 
short periodicity. The passenger data are available monthly from 1990 so 
the approach is to model this up to the point of the first intervention on the 
series. This is likely to be associated with the terrorist attacks of 
September 2001. If this model has appropriate goodness-of-fit statistics, 
sensible coefficients, is relatively parsimonious and has white noise 
residuals then its form can be re-estimated on the whole data series with 
additional interventions to represent the start of the Agreement, the 
current economic downturn and, in the case of the focuses of this paper 
the commencement of the Open Skies Agreement at the London airports, 
in particular London Heathrow (LHR) and the start of BA Open Skies 
services from Paris and Amsterdam. These interventions can be taken as 
abrupt changes, as they were when investigating the impact of a low cost 
carrier’s start-up impact on total traffic on a route (Pitfield, 2007a), or as 
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gradual changes with stepped or exponential forms. This was the 
approach used in trying to discover whether there was an impact on route 
traffic from alliances entering into code sharing agreements or benefiting 
from individual country open skies agreements, and so antitrust immunity, 
with the USA (Pitfield, 2007b). 
 
As the data from 1990 contains a variety of economic cycles, the 
expectation might be that the current recession may not appear 
substantially different to any past cycle as it has not had long enough to 
reflect its impact on the passenger data. The expectation seems to be that 
the current recession will last longer than many, but in the data set, even 
though the appropriate start date might be discussed, it only exists in total 
for some six or seven months2. It cannot, therefore, be distinct at present 
and is expected as a result not to show significance. 
 
Past experience strongly suggests that 9/11 is well modelled by an abrupt 
intervention and will be strongly significant. 
 
2. Passenger Data 
US Bureau of Transportation Statistics (1990) data were downloaded for 
monthly traffic between the UK and USA for all years from 1990 until 2008 
as well as for the first three months of 2009. This was also done for the 
traffic between France and the Netherlands and the USA. These UK – 
USA data were first filtered to extract the London- New York traffic, that 
                                                 
2 The start date throughout this analysis was taken as August 2008, just prior to the demise of 
Lehman Brothers. However, the various economic cycles contained in the data since 1990 
suggest this intervention is unnecessary, irrespective of its start date or form. 
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covers LHR, London Gatwick (LGW), London Stansted (STN) and London 
Luton (LTN) as well as London City (LCY), whereas for New York, both 
John F. Kennedy (JFK) and Newark (EWR) are covered as they have 
transatlantic traffic3. For Washington, traffic to and from John Foster 
Dulles (IAD) and Baltimore Washington International (BWI) was filtered 
and for Chicago, both O’Hare (ORD) and Midway (MDW) were used to 
represent the destination.  Los Angeles has only one international airport 
serving the UK at Los Angeles International (LAX). For the continental 
European traffic with New York, for Paris, data for Paris Charles de Gaulle 
(CDG) and Paris Orly (ORY) was filtered and for the Netherlands, the 
traffic with Amsterdam Schipol (AMS). Traffic recording zero passengers 
was eliminated from these data and represented freight movements by, for 
example, Federal Express, Kallita Air and Atlas Air and positioning 
movements, for example, by El Al, Royal Jordanian and Air France. These 
resulting data were pasted into new spreadsheets to facilitate the correct 
calculation of monthly totals and to allow these figures to be pasted into 
SPSS for time series and graphical analysis. This was not only completed 
for London - New York but also for London, with Washington, Chicago and 
Los Angeles, and Paris and Amsterdam with New York. In addition, it was 
done for LHR - New York, as well as LHR with Washington, Chicago and 
Los Angeles, although the largest differences in these figures with all the  
London airports is always for New York. In the other cases, London traffic 
and LHR traffic are often the same. This step was taken, as apart from the 
dominance of LHR in this total London traffic, the main changes resulting 
                                                 
3 La Guardia only has domestic traffic and London City had no transatlantic traffic at this time. 
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from Open Skies have taken place at LHR so it was thought sensible to 
analyse this traffic separately and to investigate the comparability of 
impacts. 
 
Figure 1 shows both London - New York traffic and LHR - New York traffic 
where, as would be expected, the two series move closely together over 
time.  
 
In the processes described above, it appeared that there has been a 
considerable rationalisation of services offered in London for New York, 
especially in 2008. In addition, an earlier relative decline in the importance 
of STN was noted, perhaps as it concentrated on low-cost carriers. 
Consequently, an exploratory analysis examined shares at LHR over the 
period and this is shown in Figure 2.  In the early 1990s, LHR share was 
around 70 percent and by 1993 this had risen to the low 80 percents. This 
is associated with the start and subsequent growth of Virgin Atlantic at 
LHR as a result of changes in the London traffic distribution rules. It is 
thought that Lord King, chairman of British Airways at the time, ceased to 
make financial contributions to the Conservative party as a result of Virgin 
being allowed to operate at LHR. The next step changes take place 
between 2001 and 2002 and reflects the greater concentration of services 
at LHR after 9/11. There is another blip in 2007 when shares at LHR 
temporarily fall and although the impact of EOS and MAXJet may have 
contributed to this, much the largest cause is the withdrawal of United 
from LHR and the corresponding growth of Delta before Open Skies at 
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LGW. Of course, as a result of Open Skies, both Continental and Delta 
move services to LHR. Traffic with Washington Airports is shown in Figure 
3, Chicago in Figure 4 and Los Angeles in Figure 5. EOS and MAXJet 
also have an impact on the Washington traffic and there also appears to 
be a rationalisation of traffic at LHR in recent years for both Washington 
and Chicago. For much of the period there is no difference in the LAX 
figures for traffic from London and traffic from LHR. In early 2008, as a 
result of the Agreement, Air France began a service, which has since 
ceased operations, from LHR to LAX. There were no important new 
carriers on the other US – UK routes although existing carriers could 
adjust the frequency of service and aircraft size. 
 
The BA Open Skies service started in Paris in June 2008 and by the year 
end, 14,406 passengers had been carried in both directions. This 
represents less than one percent of annual traffic between the cities. For 
the first three months of 2009, this share grew to 1.49 percent with a total 
of 4,927. Perhaps more significantly, the load factor for the whole 12 
months averaged 51.59 percent. It seems that the airline must have been 
attracting a sufficiently large number of high yielding business passengers, 
given that the various promised route starts from other European cities 
have not materialised and that the other service to start, from Amsterdam, 
has finished. What can the analysis of the time series tell us beyond this? 
 
Passenger traffic is shown in Figure 6 where a distinct cyclical pattern can 
be seen with what appears to be a lesser variation in more recent times 
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and early analysis in SPSS reveals the presence of outliers in the series, 
most notably in late 2001. It is clear that explicit notice will have to be 
taken of this influence if other possible influences on the series are not to 
be confounded. 
 
The BA Open Skies service to JFK from AMS started in October 2008, so 
by the time that the data used here is concerned there are only 6 months 
of operation in total. The service finished in August, so even with a fuller 
data set, covering the maximum period of operation of the service, the 
time period to be assessed would be short. 
 
In the first year of operation, the last three months of 2008, 2,036 
passengers were carried and, like the Paris – New York experience, this is 
less than one percent of annual traffic. If the first three months of 2009 are 
examined, the percentage share rises to 1.81 percent with 2,738 
passengers. However, the load factor over the whole period of operation is 
very disappointing at 29.84 percent on average, which is much less than 
the French based service, so it is easy to see why the service was 
discontinued.  
 
The passenger data are shown in Figure 7. This shows growth around an 
apparently constant variance up to early in the 21st century. The impact of 
9/11 is again plain and it appears that although the traffic has recovered, 
there is no longer an upward trend. 
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3. New York 
Following the usual procedures of examining Autocorrelation Functions 
(ACF) and Partial Autocorrelation Functions (PACF) the most appropriate 
model for London – New York is an ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,1,1)12 model on the 
original data. The RMSE is 14174.638 and other goodness-of-fit statistics 
are shown in Table 14. The impact of 9/11 is significant, but none of the 
other intervention variables are significant with the correct sign. Neither 
the Open Skies Agreement nor the advent of recession, however these 
potential impacts are represented, are significant5. 
 
Concentrating on the traffic with New York from LHR only yields similar 
results. The model has an extra autoregressive parameter as it is 
(0,1,1)(1,1,1)12 with RMSE = 17374.620 and again 9/11 is the only 
significant intervention. This is disappointing as the airline moves to LHR 
as a result of the Agreement might well have been thought to generate 
significant new traffic. Even if the actual start at the very end of March is 
considered, there is still no apparent impact on passenger traffic. The 
Residual Autocorrelation Functions are shown in Figure 8 and it clear that 
the residuals are white noise6. 
                                                 
4 The basis of the RMSE calculation and Theil’s Inequality Coefficient U is with n-k-1 degrees of 
freedom. Systematic error is shown by Um, the variance by Us and the covariance by Uc. Ideally 
Um and Us = 0 and Uc = 1. 
5 With regular differencing, the first difference of a pulse intervention, when used, is represented 
as a pulse. 
6 This is the only residual autocorrelation shown. The others are available from the author. The 
only doubt about model validity is when Residual Autocorrelations become significant, but this 
never happens at a short lag or a significant seasonal lag, such as 12 or 24. 
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 The impact of 9/11 is similar in the two models and represents an impact 
on the whole series that is around 2.4-2.8 percent of total annual traffic on 
the route in the year 2000. 
 
4. Washington 
For Washington – London traffic an ARIMA(1,0,0)(0,1,1)12 seems to give 
the best fit with RMSE = 5003.093. The parameters and other goodness-
of-fit statistics are shown in Table 2. As with the New York models, no 
matter how the downturn or the Agreement interventions are specified, 
they are insignificant7. 9/11 seems to have a negative effect of 22,913 
which represents 2.04 percent of year 2000 total traffic8. 
 
Focusing on the LHR traffic gives an ARIMA(2,0,1)(0,1,1)12 model; this 
notation means that the autoregressive parameter is estimated at lags 1 
and 29. Parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit are again shown in 
Table 2. Not surprisingly, the only intervention term of significance is the 
9/11 intervention. Given that the large scale changes in carriers on LHR – 
New York failed to show a significant impact on passenger traffic from the 
Agreement, then the other US destinations are unlikely to. It is also true 
that no measure of the economic downturn is significant.  
 
The 9/11 impact here represents 2.22 percent of year 2000 traffic which is 
consistent with the other estimates. 
                                                 
7 As there is no non-seasonal differencing, steps and pulses can be examined. 
8 The constant term is retained in these models as there is no regular differencing. 
9 The first autoregressive parameter is not reported in the table as it is insignificant. 
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 5. Chicago 
For Chicago – London traffic an ARIMA(1,1,0)(0,1,1)12 seems to give the 
best fit with RMSE = 6466.817. The parameters and other goodness-of-fit 
statistics are shown in Table 3. As with the other models, no matter how 
the Agreement intervention is specified, it is insignificant. However, the 
downturn intervention represented as an exponential decline is significant 
in the second model shown in Table 3 and has a negative impact of 
18,373. 9/11 also has an earlier negative effect on the series of between 
38,930 and 39,085 which represents 2.65 - 2.66 percent of year 2000 total 
traffic. 
 
Focusing on the LHR traffic gives an ARIMA(1,1,0)(0,1,1)12 model. It is 
not surprising that the model has the same form as the London model as 
there are only some notable and sustained differences between London 
and LHR traffic in the early and mid 1990’s.  Parameter estimates and 
goodness-of-fit are again shown in Table 3. As before, apart from the 
significance of the 9/11 term, the downturn exponential intervention is also 
significant in one model. The impact of the Agreement is never found to be 
significant. For 9/11, the intervention varies between 2.61 and 2.64 
percent of year 2000 LHR traffic and the absolute estimates are both 
correctly less than the impacts estimated on London. 
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It is not intuitively obvious why the representation of the downturn is 
significant on this corridor and although the result is reported it could be 
spurious. 
 
6. Los Angeles 
The results for Los Angeles to London and LHR are shown in Table 4. The 
ARIMA models differ despite there being little difference in the UK totals 
from London and LHR except for the early 1990’s and mid 2007. In neither 
model are the representations of the Agreement or the downturn found to 
be significant and have the correct sign. The 9/11 intervention is 
consistent with previous estimates and represents between 1.58 and 1.68 
percent of year 2000 total traffic. These impacts are less presumably 
because the impacts on travel demand at the more easterly US 
destinations from London were higher due to the location of the terrorist 
activities. 
 
7. Paris 
Analysing the ACF and PACF plots for the Paris data suggests a variety of 
suitable models could be calibrated and a logarithmic transformation could 
be imposed if it was thought that a constant variance did not exist. It 
seems that a relatively parsimonious model is to be preferred and this is 
seasonally differenced, has one seasonal moving average term and a 
single non-seasonal autoregressive parameter with no constant. 
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When the intervention variables are included, whatever the form, neither 
the advent of the Agreement nor the start of the BA Open Skies service 
are found to be significant. As expected, nether is the downturn 
intervention variable. 
 
Table 5 shows the results for three models that were investigated. These 
show slightly different impacts for 9/11 but the other interventions are 
never significant. Model 1 has a coefficient of -46,859.97 for the terrorist 
attacks influence on passenger traffic with t= -7.366 from specifying a step 
change. This represents a 2.93 percent share of year 2000 traffic. Model 2 
has lagged impacts for 9/11 with an impact of -47,135.21 in September  
(t= -7.393) and a further impact of -29,933.95 (t= -4.726) in November 
2001. Model 3 represents the impact as a pulse and has the best overall 
fit. The coefficient is now -48,799.48 (t= - 7.267). 
 
The ACF plot of the residuals along with the goodness-of-fit statistics 
suggests that this is a more than acceptable model. 
 
Another outlier in the Paris data that none of these models have been able 
to account for is found for November 2003. Investigating the traffic in detail 
suggests that this might be attributed to the activity of Air India on the 
route but the start of its service does not tie in exactly with the date of the 
outlier and these attempts to deal with this shift in level were abandoned. 
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8. Amsterdam 
Experiments with logarithmic transformations and various forms of the 
model with seasonal components suggested the better model forms to 
investigate are moving average. The best model is regularly and 
seasonally differenced with one seasonal moving average parameter and 
moving average parameters found to be significant in the non-seasonal 
model component at lag 1 and 410. Pulse representations are used  for the 
independent variables. Table 6 shows the goodness-of-fit statistics and 
the significant parameters.  
 
Not only is the 9/11 intervention effect significant (-26,760) as before but 
so is the start of the BA Open Skies service. The coefficient at 7,266 
represents approximately 10 percent of average monthly traffic between 
Amsterdam and New York in 2008 and should be interpreted as the 
impact on the whole series, which seems reasonable. This contrasts with 
the earlier reported findings for Paris – New York, where no significant 
airline intervention was found. The 9/11 effects are broadly the same in 
the cases of Paris and Amsterdam. This is in terms of their relative 
impacts by comparison with the basic level of passenger traffic on the 
routes.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 This model is not particularly parsimonious but deals with identified outliers. 
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 9. Conclusion 
Attempts to determine the impact of the EU-US Open Skies Agreement 
have been presented from London (and separately from LHR) to four 
major US cities. In no case has a significant impact on passenger 
numbers been found. This is especially surprising in the LHR – New York 
case, where new services were initiated at LHR, often moving from other 
London area airports.  However, the variation in airline strategic behaviour 
implicitly modelled in the time series from 1990 shows that there is nothing 
significantly different in recent variations in passenger numbers that needs 
to be explained where these variations may have resulted from the 
Agreement. No particular boost or discontinuity in passenger numbers 
was found beyond that which could be explained by airlines’ choice of 
frequency, aircraft size and fare setting already implicit in the model since 
1990. 
 
In every route examined, significant impacts were found for 9/11 and were 
not found for the economic downturn. Both of these findings are expected 
as 9/11’s impact has previously been established and the downturn in the 
data up to March 2009 will look no different to previous downturns 
encapsulated in the variation in passenger data from 1990. To establish 
any impact will require a longer data series11. 
 
                                                 
11 There is some evidence that the recession in the UK ended in the third quarter of 2009. Sunday 
Times, 20 December 2009. 
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If this modelling attempt has failed to find an impact on passenger 
numbers it may be judged that the case that the data initiatives on fares, 
costs and competition is less compelling. 
 
If the impact of the start of the BA Open Skies service from Paris is 
focused on, where this was facilitated by the Agreement, the fact that it 
has not been found to have a significant impact on traffic may not be 
surprising given the scale of the traffic and the relatively short period of 
operation. However, as it was stated in Pitfield (forthcoming), 
 
. . . .  there is no doubt that the Agreement facilitated this 
service and this in turn facilitated traffic. On this basis it 
cannot be argued that there was no impact.  However, the 
fact that BA discontinued the AMS service and has not 
initiated service at Milan, Frankfurt or Brussels, as it 
originally planned, plus rumours about its desire to sell the 
subsidiary all suggest that the degree of success is relatively 
disappointing even though its share of high yielding business 
traffic from Paris may not be. 
 
The impact at AMS, by contrast, is significant. It is the only significant 
impact on traffic found in this analysis. The start of the BA Open Skies 
service mattered. However, if there is a significant impact on traffic, why 
has the service been discontinued? Firstly, as already indicated, the load 
factors are poor overall and did not improve in the first part of 2009 and 
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perhaps, unlike the French case, the share of the business traffic between 
the two cities that has been captured is insufficient to compensate for the 
load factors with enough high yielding passengers. It may also be that the 
opportunity of initiating a JFK service from London City Airport also came 
into the equation whilst British Airways is facing economic difficulties, 
given available aircraft. 
 
It seems, with the last noted exception, that the expectations of airlines, 
consultancies, civil servants and governments are mistaken in expecting a 
significant change in passenger numbers to result from changes in 
regulation. What the Agreement has done, is to increase airline choice in 
terms of where they can fly from, subject to slot constraints, and in the 
same way, consumer choice has also been increased. 
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Table 1 ARIMA Models of London – New York Passengers, 1990 – March 
2009 
 
Model 1 London 
 
Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
MA(1) 0.457 7.563  
SMA(1) 0.423 6.715 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.635          
Intervention 9/11 -116833.003 -10.914 Normalised BIC = 19.364 
   RMSE = 14174.638 
   U = 0.023  Um = 0.000 
   Us =0.024  Uc = 0.962 
Model 2 LHR    
MA(1) 0.455 7.099  
SAR(1) 0.575 4.997  
SMA(1) 0.904 9.574 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.700        
Intervention 9/11 -87183.614 -9.356 Normalised BIC = 19.200 
   RMSE = 17374.620 
   U = 0.033  Um = 0.008 
   Us =0.052  Uc = 0.920 
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Table 2 ARIMA Models of London – Washington Passengers, 1990 – March 
2009 
 
 
Model 1 London 
 
Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
Constant 4689.398 6.438  
AR(1) 0.792 18.880 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.710         
SMA(1) 0.605 10.028 Normalised BIC = 17.188 
   RMSE = 5003.093 
Intervention 9/11 -22913.120 -5.886 U = 0.030  Um = 0.000 
   Us =0.000  Uc = 0.982 
Model 2 LHR    
Constant 2670.228 3.645  
AR(2) 0.607 9.052 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.746        
MA(1) -0.705 -12.096 Normalised BIC = 17.047 
SMA(1) 0.525 8.044 RMSE = 4472.988 
   U = 0.028 Um = 0.000 
Intervention 9/11 -22658.412 -6.281 Us =0.000  Uc = 0.977 
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Table 3 ARIMA Models of London – Chicago Passengers, 1990 – March 
2009 
 
 
Model 1 London 
 
Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
AR(1) -0.268 -3.972 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.481         
SMA(1)  0.490  7.432 Normalised BIC = 17.677 
   RMSE = 6466.817 
Intervention 9/11 -39085.018 -7.202 U = 0.032  Um = 0.000 
   Us =0.004  Uc = 0.982 
Model 2 London 
 
Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
AR(1) -0.258 -3.842 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.492         
SMA(1)  0.482  7.284 Normalised BIC = 17.686 
Intervention 
Downturn Exponential 
-18373.960 -2.115 RMSE = 6415.485 
   U = 0.031  Um = 0.000 
Intervention 9/11 -38930.330 -7.232 Us =0.004  Uc = 0.977 
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Table 3 ARIMA Models of London – Chicago Passengers, 1990 – March 
2009 continued 
 
 
Model 1 LHR 
 
Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
AR(1) -0.151 -2.166 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.582         
SMA(1)  0.474  7.306 Normalised BIC = 17.615 
   RMSE = 5911.490 
Intervention 9/11 -38277.444 -7.508 U = 0.029  Um = 0.000 
   Us =0.004  Uc = 0.982 
Model 2 LHR 
 
Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
AR(1) -0.253 -3.731 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.513         
SMA(1)  0.470  7.040 Normalised BIC = 17.709 
Intervention 
Downturn Exponential 
-18528.085 -2.129 RMSE = 6539.913 
   U = 0.032  Um = 0.005 
Intervention 9/11 -38791.771 -7.226 Us =0.015  Uc = 0.962 
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Table 4 ARIMA Models of London – Los Angeles Passengers, 1990 – March 
2009 
 
 
Model 1 London 
 
Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
Constant 4676.319 6.916 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.744         
AR(1) 0.774 17.152 Normalised BIC = 17.6690 
SAR(1) 0.241 2.234 RMSE = 6445.401 
SMA(1) 0.821 9.974 U = 0.028  Um = 0.000 
   Us =0.003  Uc = 0.974 
Intervention 9/11 -25267.729 -5.038  
    
Model 2 LHR 
 
Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
SMA(1)  0.608  10.319 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.448         
    Normalised BIC = 17.659 
Intervention 9/11 -26823.224 -4.753 RMSE = 6393.617 
   U = 0.029  Um = 0.000 
   Us =0.004  Uc = 0.987 
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Table 5 ARIMA Models of Paris – New York Passengers, 1990 – March 2009 
 
Model 1 Paris 
 
Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
AR(1) 0.753 16.795 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.764          
SMA(1) 0.429 6.583 Normalised BIC = 18.145 
Intervention 9/11 -46859.974 -7.366 RMSE = 8091.859 
   U = 0.031  Um = 0.004 
   Us =0.002  Uc = 0.972 
    
Model 2 Paris    
AR(1) 0.758 16.615 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.748          
SMA(1) 0.417 6.350 Normalised BIC = 18.197 
Intervention 9/11, Lag 0 -47135.211 -7.393 RMSE = 8302.462 
Intervention 9/11, Lag 2 -29933.950 -4.726 U = 0.032  Um = 0.000 
   Us =0.005  Uc = 0.987 
    
Model 3 Paris    
AR(1) 0.750 16.712 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.771         
SMA(1) 0.446 6.973 Normalised BIC = 18.142 
Intervention 9/11 -48799.481 -7.267 RMSE = 7982.063 
   U = 0.031  Um = 0.001 
   Us =0.001  Uc = 0.971 
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Table 6:  ARIMA Model of Amsterdam – New York Passengers, 1990 – 
March 2009 
 
 
Model 1 Amsterdam 
 
Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
MA(1) 0.239 3.547  
MA(4) 0.255 3.641 Stationary R-Squared  = 
0.565          
SMA(1) 0.594 9.089 Normalised BIC = 16.792 
BA Open Skies 7,266.431 2.454 RMSE = 3867.559 
Intervention 9/11 -26,760.424 -8.141 U = 0.028  Um = 0.000 
   Us =0.000  Uc = 0.954 
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Figure 1: London – New York Passenger Traffic by Month, January 1990  
– March 2009 
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Figure 2: Annual LHR/London % Share of New York Traffic, 1990-2009 
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Figure 3: London – Washington Passenger Traffic by Month, January 1990 – 
March 2009 
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Figure 4: London – Chicago Passenger Traffic by Month, January 1990  
– March 2009 
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Figure 5: London – Los Angeles Passenger Traffic by Month, January 1990 
– March 2009 
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Figure 6:   Paris - New York Passenger Traffic by Month, January 1990 – March 
2009 
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Figure 7: Amsterdam - New York Passenger Traffic by Month, January 1990 
– March 2009 
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Figure 8: Residual Autocorrelation Functions for New York ARIMA  
models 
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